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Presidential Progress On Climate Change: 
Will The Courts Interfere With What Needs  
To Be Done To Save Our Planet? 
 
Michael B. Gerrard 
 Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ran with the strongest climate change platform of any major party 
presidential nominee.  He called for a 100% carbon-free electricity grid by 2035 and net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.  However, he takes office with the most conservative 
Supreme Court in generations, with six of the nine justices nominated by Republican presidents 
(including three by President Trump). Are the new president and the Supreme Court on a 
collision course when it comes to climate change? 
 None of the six conservative justices are known as passionate environmentalists, and 
Amy Coney Barrett caused considerable heartburn when she refused to express a view on 
climate change at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, calling it a “very contentious matter 
of public debate.”  Most importantly, however, most or all of them (we’re not yet sure about 
Justice Barrett) have some hostility to the administrative state, and to opening the courthouse 
doors to plaintiffs who are complaining about problems like climate change. 
I. Congressional (In)Action 
 As shown below, most of the legal theories that could be used to attack expected Biden 
administration actions on climate change stem from the current absence of comprehensive 
congressional legislation.  Congress has not enacted significant environmental legislation since 
1990, with two exceptions (discussed below). Therefore, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and other agencies have needed to craft solutions to new problems from statutes that 
date back to the 1970s. 
 The two exceptions are instructive.  The first is the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety 
for the 21st Century Act of 2016, a thorough rewrite of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 
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1976.1  It was passed with the support of not only environmental groups but also the most 
affected industry, chemical manufacturing, which preferred national uniformity to a patchwork 
of state laws. The second exception is tucked into the 5,600-page 2021 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, popularly called the COVID relief bill, which President Trump reluctantly 
signed into law on December 27, 2020.2 Lurking on pages 2759-2803 of the House print was a 
new law phasing out the use of hydrofluorocarbons, a powerful greenhouse gas used mostly as 
a refrigerant.  It, too, had the support of the key affected industries (those that make refrigerants 
and the devices that use them, like air conditioners and freezers), which were also weary of a 
hodgepodge of state laws.  The COVID relief bill also provides help for renewable energy, 
carbon dioxide removal, and other climate-friendly actions. It is the most important climate 
change law ever passed by Congress (though that in itself is not saying much).   
 The fact that such provisions could be passed in Mitch McConnell’s Senate may mean 
that not all hope is lost for climate bills that don’t gore too many oxen and have strong support 
from business.  Of course, legislation that is up to the task of seriously fighting climate change 
will gore a lot of oxen and be opposed by some powerful interest groups.  Such a new law is 
unlikely during the next two years. Although Democrats won both Georgia runoff elections on 
January 4, giving their party (with a tiebreaking vote by Vice President Kamala Harris) control 
of the Senate, there does not seem to be the necessary unanimous support in the Democratic 
caucus to revoke the filibuster and allow legislation to pass with fewer than 60 votes. The 
“reconciliation” procedure allows tax and budget legislation to pass with a simple majority, so 
in theory, the Senate could enact bills imposing a carbon tax and revoking fossil fuel subsidies 
without any Republican votes, but the appetite for these, too, is uncertain.  More likely may be 
the use of the Congressional Review Act, an oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn 
rules issued by federal agencies, to revoke some of the Trump administration’s last-minute 
weakening of environmental regulations, and greater appropriations for clean energy.  
 If Congress does enact a strong climate law, any challenges to it will likely take a few 
years to work their way through the lower courts before coming to the Supreme Court.  At least 
that is the usual course for important cases. However, in recent years, we have seen the growth 
of the “shadow docket,” where the Supreme Court rather abruptly stays executive actions or 
(especially under Trump) lower court decisions blocking implementation of executive actions.  
The Court’s shadow docket decisions are issued without oral arguments or time for amicus 
briefs, and often without the Court giving its reasons. That is what happened in 2016 when, by 
an unsigned 5-4 order, the Court stayed implementation of the Clean Power Plan, the Obama 
administration’s signature regulation to reduce power plant emissions.  The Roberts Court has 
 
1 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 447 (2016). 
2 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. (2021). 
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lately used some version of this hasty procedure numerous times in cases concerning voting 
rights, immigration, and other important matters.3 
II. Dangerous Doctrines 
 Just about all important federal actions on climate change are challenged in court as 
soon as they become ripe.  That happened under Presidents G.W. Bush, Obama, and Trump, 
and will surely continue under President Biden. These are the legal doctrines that are most 
likely to be used to challenge environmental actions. 
A. Administrative Law Doctrines 
 There are three administrative law doctrines whose applications to challenges to 
environmental legislation are in particular flux: the major questions doctrine, Chevron deference, 
and the nondelegation doctrine. Although each of these raises potential legal hurdles for 
environmental legislation, Congress can avoid the major questions and Chevron deference 
problems by enacting statutes that unambiguously authorize EPA or other agencies to take 
certain actions against climate change.  The nondelegation doctrine is harder to get around, and 
if the courts use it aggressively, they could strike down any number of regulations that they 
deem involve improperly delegated powers.  As Professor Ann Carlson and colleagues have 
written, “It is impossible for Congress to specify every policy detail within a law, and this 
expectation is particularly unrealistic for environmental laws that require scientific expertise, 
technological judgment, and risk assessment, all of which change over time based on new 
developments and understanding.”4  Despite these difficulties, climate policymakers and 
regulators can use certain tactics to reduce potential nondelegation and major question risks, 
including being as specific and unambiguous as possible; staying as close as possible to existing 
structures and authorities; and making them severable. 
1. The Major Questions Doctrine  
 The major questions doctrine holds that agency decisions that have “vast ‘economic and 
political significance’” are subject to heightened scrutiny, requiring clear congressional 
authorization before courts will defer to agency determinations.5  The doctrine favors the status 
quo, because if the courts say that agencies may not act on a big problem without specific 
congressional authorization, and Congress is paralyzed (as it has been with climate change for 
decades), everything is frozen. 
The doctrine stems in part from Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson, in 
which the Court held that the FDA cannot regulate tobacco products because Congress has not 
explicitly authorized it to do so, even though smoking is the nation’s leading cause of 
 
3 David Gans, The Roberts Court, The Shadow Docket, and the Unraveling of Voting Rights Remedies, ACS ISSUE 
BRIEF (Oct. 2020); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 
(2019). 
4 Ann Carlson et al., Climate Policymaking in the Shadow of the Supreme Court, LEGAL PLANET, (Oct. 27, 2020). 
5 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). 
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premature death (at least until COVID-19).6  It has subsequently been relied upon in a number 
of environmental law cases, including a 2014 opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia where 
the Court applied the doctrine to find that EPA may not apply certain restrictions on 
greenhouse gas emissions to stationary sources that were not already regulated under the Clean 
Air Act.7 In an earlier Clean Air Act case, Justice Scalia wrote that “Congress … does not alter 
the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does 
not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”8   
 The major questions doctrine may have been narrowed in a 2020 decision in an entirely 
different area of law.  In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act bars employers from firing workers because of their LGBTQ status.9  The 
statute prohibits “discrimination … because of … sex.”  Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion for the 6-
3 majority stated, “We can’t deny that today’s holding … is an elephant. But where’s the 
mousehole? Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in employment … is written in starkly 
broad terms…. Congress’s key drafting choices … virtually guaranteed that unexpected 
applications would emerge over time. This elephant has never hidden in a mousehole; it has 
been standing before us all along.” 
 This same reasoning can be applied to the Clean Air Act and greenhouse gases.  The 
statute defines “air pollutant” in starkly broad terms.10  Moreover, it establishes a procedure to 
regulate additional air pollutants based on “the latest scientific knowledge,”11 and it includes 
“effects on … climate” in the list of adverse impacts to be considered.12  As Professor Richard 
Revesz recently demonstrated, the legislative materials surrounding the passage of the Clean 
Air Act of 1970 are replete with references to climate change.13  In short, the elephant of climate 
change has been standing in the Clean Air Act for fifty years.  There should be no question that 




6 Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.  , 529 U.S. 120 (2000).  
7 Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (2014). The G.W. Bush EPA unsuccessfully tried to use this 
doctrine in defending its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases in the landmark 2007 case of Massachusetts 
v. EPA.  
8 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
9 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
10 42 U.S.C. §7602(g). 
11 42 U.S.C. §7408(a)(2). 
12 42 U.S.C. §7602(h). 
13 Richard L. Revesz, Bostock and the End of the Climate Change Double Standard, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (2021 
forthcoming). 
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2. Chevron Deference 
 The Chevron doctrine is an administrative law principle under which courts defer to an 
implementing agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear statute.14  This 
deference is helpful to an agency that is trying to act in an area, such as climate change, where 
the details of its authority or the procedures it must follow are unclear. For example, it may be 
clear that the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, but it may not be 
clear exactly what types or sizes of stationary sources it may regulate for these pollutants.    
 For decades, conservative scholars have argued that Chevron deference gives too much 
discretion to agencies and offends (among other things) the appropriate separation of powers 
among the branches of government.  It now appears possible that at least five votes may be 
found on the current Supreme Court to narrow Chevron deference.15 If that happens, it could be 
harder for agencies to use existing statutes to tackle climate change because, without new 
congressional legislation, they could be limited to the explicit applications that existed when the 
statutes were passed in the 1970s. 
3. Nondelegation Doctrine  
The nondelegation doctrine has the thinnest basis in precedent but may pose the greatest 
danger to climate actions by the Biden administration.  Derived from the clause in Article I 
Section 1 of the Constitution that vests all legislative power in Congress, the nondelegation 
doctrine, its proponents claim, bars Congress from delegating its legislative powers to 
administrative agencies.  The Supreme Court has used this doctrine to strike down regulations 
only twice; both were in 1935 concerning New Deal rules.16 For the next 84 years, the doctrine 
had little traction in the Supreme Court. But in 2019 the Court decided Gundy v. United States, a 
challenge to use of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).17  Before 
SORNA was enacted, Herman Gundy was convicted of sexually assaulting a minor in 
Maryland. He later moved to New York but failed to register there as a sex offender, as rules 
under SORNA then required.  He was convicted of not registering.  Gundy argued that 
Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it authorized the Attorney 
General to issue rules for who had to register under SORNA.  The majority opinion by Justice 
Kagan rejected this claim, but Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas.  Justice Samuel Alito did not join the dissent, but said he 
 
14 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Use of the major 
questions doctrine to limit agency authority can be seen as an exception to Chevron deference. 
15 See Kristen E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931 (2021); 
James Goodwin, Will Confirming Judge Barrett be the Death of Chevron Deference?, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS (Oct. 15, 2020).  . 
16 Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 
(1935). 
17 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
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was willing to reconsider the issue in an appropriate case.  Although Justice Brett Kavanaugh 
was not on the Court when the case was argued, he later indicated in a statement denying 
certiorari in a similar case that he was favorably disposed to Justice Gorsuch’s view.18 
 Although we do not know Justice Barrett’s views on this issue, we now have at least five 
justices who seem inclined to deploy the nondelegation doctrine against a statute that they 
believe leaves too many important decisions to an agency. 
B. Other Constitutional Law Doctrines 
1. Standing  
 The standing doctrine, derived primarily from the Constitution’s requirement that the 
federal courts may adjudicate only “cases or controversies,” limits who can sue. In recent years 
the Supreme Court has set forth three constitutional requirements that a plaintiff must meet to 
establish standing: (1) the challenged action will cause plaintiff some actual or threatened 
injury-in-fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is 
redressable by judicial action.19 In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the 
state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases 
from motor vehicles. In particular, the Court found that Massachusetts had satisfied the third 
standing requirement – that the injury is redressable by judicial action. Although no one court 
decision can solve the global problem of climate change, the Court found that states receive 
“special solicitude” in a standing analysis to protect their own citizens.  In the years since 
Massachusetts, states have been among the named plaintiffs in many of the suits challenging 
government action, or inaction, on climate change. 
 Massachusetts was a 5-4 decision. Three of the dissenters are still on the bench – Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.  The fourth, Justice Scalia, has been replaced by 
Justice Gorsuch.  Of the five in the majority that ruled for the plaintiffs, Justice Kennedy has 
been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been replaced by 
Justice Barrett (who clerked for Justice Scalia and who while on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit wrote a decision denying standing to an environmental group challenging 
construction in a park20). Thus, there are now only three members of the Court who one could 
confidently say would reaffirm Massachusetts’ standing holding – Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia 
 
18 United States v. Paul, No. 17-5329 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 589 U.S. ___ (2019) (J. Kavanaugh, 
concurring in denial of certiorari). 
19 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 1156 (8th ed. 2018). 
A fourth requirement, that the injury is to an interest within the zone of interests to be protected by the 
statute alleged to have been violated, is prudential and thus could be overturned by Congress. 
20 Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 19-3333 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. This has made many commentators believe that the current Court 
might overturn or dial back the standing portion of the Massachusetts decision.21   
 The standing doctrine is asymmetric in the climate context.  Environmental plaintiffs 
may have trouble establishing redressability, and sometimes it is difficult for them to show that 
their injury is caused by climate change and, in particular, by the specific action they are 
challenging.  On the other hand, industry plaintiffs can readily show that the regulation they 
are fighting will hurt them economically, and that if the regulation goes away, so will their 
pain.22 In short, industry can usually sue; environmentalists often cannot. 
 If the standing of environmental plaintiffs is restricted, that would not impede the Biden 
administration from acting on climate change.  However, it could greatly impair the ability of 
citizens and perhaps even states to challenge climate actions by this or a subsequent 
administration that they feel are too weak.  Even if Congress passes a strong climate law, a later 
President who wants to disregard it might be able to do so without fear of judicial interference 
if no one has standing to sue. 
2. The Commerce Clause  
 The Constitution’s Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate activity 
substantially affecting interstate commerce, is the basis for most environmental statutes. 
Beginning with the New Deal, the Clause has been upheld as the source of congressional 
authority to enact the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Civil Rights Act, the Controlled Substances 
Act, and much more. As Professor Patrick Parenteau has written, “[l]imiting Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power is a high priority for conservative groups like the Federalist Society, 
Cato Institute and the Chamber of Commerce” because a diminished Commerce Clause means 
more limited government and, thus, less regulation of industry.23 
 Justice Barrett has previously taken a narrow view of the Commerce Clause.  When she 
was a professor at Notre Dame Law School, she wrote a law review article arguing that the 
Affordable Care Act is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.24  Some of the other conservative justices have skirted the issue of whether 
some environmental laws exceed this authority.25 
 
21 There is some worry, but less so, that the Court will overturn the portions of the decision that found 
that the Clean Air Act obligates EPA to regulate greenhouse gases if it finds that they endanger public 
health and welfare. 
22 See Lisa Heinzerling, The Rule of Five Guys, 119 U. MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
23 Patrick Parenteau, The Trump Court and the Erosion of Environmental Law, HILL, November 1, 2020. 
Commerce Clause arguments are often raised against state environmental laws that arguably regulate 
extraterritorially or burden interstate commerce, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.  
24 Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 61 (2017). 
25 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  
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 Federal climate change regulation does not seem especially vulnerable to a Commerce 
Clause challenge, as climate change is such an intrinsically interstate (indeed, international) 
problem, and greenhouse gases cross state and national borders.  Other areas of environmental 
law are potentially more susceptible to this argument, such as the issue of whether isolated 
waters can be regulated under the Clean Water Act26, and whether species that never cross state 
lines and are not in commerce can be protected under the Endangered Species Act. 
III. Application of Doctrines to Climate Regulation 
 The Trump administration systematically worked to rescind the climate and other 
regulations adopted by the Obama administration.  Many of their efforts have been struck 
down in court, mostly for procedural irregularities, but some have eventually succeeded.27  
These repeal efforts have been tracked by Columbia Law School’s Sabin Center for Climate 
Change Law, Harvard Law School’s Environmental & Energy Law Program, and most recently 
the University of California, Berkeley Law School’s Center for Law, Energy & the Environment, 
and the litigation challenging these repeals has been tracked by the Sabin Center and by New 
York University’s Institute for Policy Integrity.  Reversing these rollbacks is high on the agenda 
of the Biden administration, and several academic centers and advocacy organizations have laid 
out in considerable detail what can be done.28  The procedural requirements for accomplishing 
these reversals are well established in administrative law, such as setting forth a detailed 
explanation of the reasons for the policy changes and backing them up with a factual record and 
legal justifications.  Some reversals can be done with the stroke of a pen (or a few pens); others 
will have to go through a formal notice and comment rulemaking process.  But almost nothing 
the Trump administration did in the environmental and energy realms is legally irrevocable 
(except perhaps for some long-term leases of federal land for resource extraction).  The Biden 
administration will no doubt take care to follow the necessary procedures, and if it does, it will 
likely prevail against any challenges, and such cases are unlikely to be taken up by the Supreme 
Court. 
 In addition to substantive rollbacks, the Trump administration planted several 
administrative land mines to make it more difficult for successors to impose stronger climate 
 
26 There is a longstanding controversy over the Waters of the United States rule, and in particular whether 
the existing definitions in the Clean Water Act apply to isolated or intermittent waters, and whether the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate such waters.  Successive 
administrations have adopted regulations that expand or contract the Act’s coverage, and the Supreme 
Court has left much confusion. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).   
27 JESSICA WENTZ & MICHAEL B. GERRARD, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., COLUM. L. SCH., PERSISTENT 
REGULATIONS: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S EFFORTS TO REPEAL FEDERAL 
CLIMATE PROTECTIONS (2019). 
28 E.g., SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., COLUM. L. SCH., CLIMATE REREGULATION IN A BIDEN 
ADMINISTRATION (2020); BETHANY DAVIS NOLL & NATALIE JACEWICZ, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. INST. FOR POL’Y 
INTEGRITY, A ROADMAP TO REGULATORY STRATEGY IN AN ERA OF HYPER-PARTISANSHIP (2020); Resetting the 
Course of EPA, ENVTL. PROT. NETWORK (Aug. 12, 2020). 
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regulations.  These included lowering the “social cost of carbon” (the dollar estimation of the 
economic damage from emitting more carbon), adopting procedures that lower costs and 
disregard benefits, and making other mischief in the use of cost-benefit analysis; and under the 
guise of ”transparency,” barring the use of important medical evidence in setting air quality 
standards.29  These need to be cleared away using the necessary procedures. 
 But it is not enough to rescind the rollbacks and defuse the land mines. That is merely 
the start.  It would take us back to where we were in January 2017, which is a much better place 
than where we are now, but nowhere near the trajectory needed to achieve the clean energy and 
net zero emissions targets set by President Biden30 – targets that scientists tell us need to be met 
if the U.S. is to play its part in avoiding catastrophic climate change.31 
 Set forth below are some of the most important things the Biden administration can do 
to meet the President’s targets. 
A. Motor Vehicles 
 Transportation has become the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.32  Of this 
transportation contribution, passenger cars account for 41 percent; freight trucks, 23 percent; 
and light-duty trucks including sport utility vehicles, pickup trucks and minivans, 17 percent.33 
Passenger cars and light-duty trucks tend to be regulated together, so they deserve especially 
close attention. 
 Two federal agencies regulate these vehicles, and each does so with explicit statutory 
authority. The first is EPA, which sets air pollution emission standards under the Clean Air 
Act.34 Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA must include greenhouse 
gases as “air pollutants” if it issues a formal “endangerment finding”, concluding that 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases threaten the public health and public welfare 
of current and future generations, which EPA did in 2009.  For most pollutants, these standards 
must “reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through an application of 
 
29 See generally, MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ, REVIVING RATIONALITY: SAVING COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR THE SAKE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2020); Joseph Goffman & Laura 
Bloomer, Disempowering the EPA: How statutory Interpretation of the Clean Air Act Serves the Trump 
Administration’s Deregulatory Agenda, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929 (2020). See also Environmental Defense 
Fund v. EPA, No. 4:21-cv-00003-BMM (Dist. Montana, February 1, 2021) (vacating EPA’s misnamed 
“science transparency” rule). 
30 JOHN LARSEN ET AL, RHODIUM GROUP, TAKING STOCK 2016: PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING US CLIMATE 
GOALS (2016). 
31 E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C (2018). 
32 EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990-2018, 2-25 (2020).  
33 Id. at 2-32. 
34 42 U.S.C. §7521. 
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technology which [EPA] determines will be available for the model year to which such 
standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors.”35   
The second federal agency to regulate vehicles is the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), which sets fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA). Since no one has invented a device that can filter carbon dioxide 
before it exits the tailpipe, the only ways to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles per 
mile traveled are to burn less fuel and to reduce the lifecycle carbon intensity of the fuel (such as 
by adding ethanol or by reducing reliance on heavy crude oil as a feedstock in refineries).  By 
statute, emissions standards should be set by the NHTSA at “the maximum feasible average 
fuel economy level that the Secretary [of Transportation] decides the manufacturers can achieve 
in that model year.”36 
In addition to EPA and NHTSA, the state of California also plays a key role in regulating 
motor vehicles. The Clean Air Act allows California to set more stringent greenhouse gas 
standards if EPA provides a federal preemption waiver; other states may then adopt the 
California standards.37  Thus, the automobile industry has three regulators – EPA, NHTSA, and 
California – sometimes imposing inconsistent requirements.  This led to thirty years of litigation 
and congressional action concerning such matters as stringency, pacing, preemption, and 
feasible technologies. In 2010, when the automobile industry was facing a financial crisis and 
several of the automakers were on the brink of bankruptcy, the White House brokered an 
elaborate deal to bail out the industry and achieve a unified set of fuel economy and emissions 
standards through model year 2025 cars. These standards included dramatically more stringent 
greenhouse gas standards coordinated with California and a corresponding expected doubling 
of the fuel economy standards, subject to a “mid-term review” of the standards for model years 
2022-2025, to be completed by 2018.  Although automobile manufacturers agreed not to 
challenge the deal in court, several non-automobile trade associations did sue, largely because 
greenhouse gas standards for motor vehicles triggered rules for stationary sources. The D.C. 
Circuit consolidated and then handily dismissed the more than 100 lawsuits filed.38  The Obama 
administration and California each accelerated the mid-term review shortly before Trump’s 
inauguration, affirming the standards through model year 2025. The deal to eventually double 
fuel economy standards was the Obama administration’s greatest achievement in quantifiably 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 When Donald Trump took office, he blew up the deal, immediately moving to 
reconsider the mid-term review, ultimately rolling back the rate of emissions reductions by 
 
35 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(3)(A)(i). 
36 49 U.S.C. §32902(a).  
37 42 U.S.C. §7543. 
38 Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (DC. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 
other grounds, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
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about two-thirds for model years 2021 forward, revoking the California waiver, and 
interpreting the fuel economy law to bar all state greenhouse gas regulations.  When four of the 
major automakers cut a side deal with California to improve their fuel economy anyway, 
Trump threatened to have the Department of Justice sue them for antitrust violations (though it 
never did).  As Trump left office, several lawsuits against EPA and NHTSA over these actions 
were pending, brought by several states, cities, and environmental groups. An early task of the 
Biden administration is to try to put this all back together again. Then, it will have to go far 
beyond the Obama deal.   
All scenarios for achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 involve all new 
cars and light trucks being zero emission vehicles.  EPA and NHTSA could progressively 
tighten emissions standards and move the fleet increasingly toward electric vehicles. They can 
also act to restore California’s authority to encourage this shift.  Unless automakers go along 
with this shift, however, they can be expected to challenge the new rules as not “achievable” or 
“feasible” or as not meeting the various criteria set forth in the governing statutes.  Moving to 
an all-electric system is a massively disruptive but absolutely necessary undertaking that will 
require a comprehensive national network of electric vehicle charging stations, a massive 
increase in electricity generation, and a reconfiguration of the electricity grid. It will also 
displace hundreds of thousands of gasoline station workers.39  Similar legal processes will be 
needed for medium- and heavy-duty engines and vehicles, but unless battery technology 
improves considerably some may need other methods to have both zero emissions and long 
ranges, introducing other complications.40 
 Even if the automakers are amenable, many other parties have a stake in what happens 
and possibly divergent interests – auto dealers, parts suppliers, labor unions, fleet owners, 
consumers, the oil and power industries, and others.  Thus, it will be essential for EPA and 
NHTSA to be scrupulous in building up a record showing that they appropriately considered 
and balanced the factors required by the relevant statutes.  The degree of deference that the 
courts afford the agencies may help determine the outcomes, but at least here EPA and NHTSA 
have clear statutory authority. 
B. Coal 
 After motor vehicles, coal-fired power plants are the second largest source of U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions.41  The scenarios for achieving net zero emissions all call for the 
 
39 Amy L. Stein & Joshua P. Fershee, Light-Duty Vehicles, in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 353-383 (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach, eds., 2019). 
40 Andrea Hudson Campbell et al., Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Freight, in LEGAL PATHWAYS supra note 39 at 
384-423. 
41 EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990-2018, ES-29 (2020). 
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elimination of the use of coal to generate electricity.42 The Clean Air Act gives EPA ample 
authority to impose stricter regulations on new coal-fired power plants,43 but existing 
regulations, competition from cheap natural gas and renewables, and other factors mean almost 
no new coal plants are being built in the United States anymore. 
 The big problem is the approximately 240 coal plants that still operate.44 Several plants 
retire every year, but not at the rate necessary to meet climate goals.  When the Clean Air Act 
was enacted in 1970, it was assumed that most of the coal plants would retire on their own soon 
enough. Thus, these old plants were mostly grandfathered (i.e. exempted) from the new 
regulations. The principal regulatory programs apply only to new or significantly modified 
sources of coal-fired power.45 In an effort to get at these long-lived plants, EPA has used several 
programs under the Clean Air Act (those controlling acid rain, cross-state pollution, regional 
haze, hazardous pollutants like mercury, and others), the Clean Water Act (for thermal 
discharges), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (for coal ash impoundments), but 
many coal plants still spew out air pollution.46 
 In 2011, the Supreme Court rejected an effort by several states to enjoin greenhouse gas 
emissions from coal plants as a federal common law nuisance, concluding that EPA can regulate 
these plants under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, thereby displacing the federal common 
law.47  So, EPA decided to use Section 111(d)48 as the centerpiece of its efforts to control coal 
plants through President Obama’s Clean Power Plan.  Unfortunately, Section 111(d) is fraught 
with difficulty. To begin with, it does not allow EPA to regulate the plants directly. Instead, 
EPA needs to tell the states to submit and enforce plans, which would take years. Additionally, 
there is a question as to whether the section allows EPA to impose requirements “outside the 
fenceline” of power plants, such as by effectively requiring that they build new renewable 
generation or improve customers’ energy efficiency or if such efforts intruded on the turf of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).   
The Clean Power Plan was met with a ferocious legal battle, led by West Virginia and 
Texas.  On February 9, 2016, while the case was still being litigated in the D.C. Circuit, the 
Supreme Court issued, by a vote of 5-4, a one-paragraph order staying implementation of the 
Clean Power Plan until the litigation over it was completed, without stating its reasons. Four 
 
42 E.g., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK, AMERICA'S ZERO CARBON ACTION PLAN (2020); 
HIGH MEADOWS ENVTL. INST., PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, NET-ZERO AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IMPACTS (2020). Some coal will still be needed for metallurgical purposes. 
43 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §7411(b). 
44 50 US coal power plants shut under Trump, PHYS.ORG, (May 9, 2019).  
45 42 U.S.C. §§7411(a), 7575(a). 
46 RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” 
(2016). 
47 Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
48 42 U.S.C. §7411(d). 
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days later, Justice Scalia died. Had the sequence been different, a 4-4 vote would have left 
standing the D.C. Circuit’s denial of a stay.  The Supreme Court’s stay stunned just about 
everyone and profoundly demoralized the many EPA employees who had spent years 
developing the plan.  The D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the case in September 2016 but 
never issued a decision. Donald Trump promised during his presidential campaign to repeal 
the Clean Power Plan. His EPA fulfilled that promise and replaced the plan with a toothless 
new rule, which was struck down by the D.C. Circuit on January 19, 2021.49 
 The Supreme Court’s stay was a bad omen for the future of the Clean Power Plan, and 
the presence of three new justices appointed by President Trump makes the outlook even 
bleaker for an effort by the Biden administration to restore the Clean Power Plan.  As a result, 
few expect the Biden administration to do so.  Rather, there will probably be an effort to modify 
it and also to use various other tools under the Clean Air Act and other laws to tackle the 
problem of emissions from old coal plants.  For example, EPA could (1) increase costs for these 
plants by further controlling non-greenhouse gas emissions; (2) lower national ambient air 
quality standards for fine particulate matter and ozone; (3) impose stricter emissions controls on 
mercury (a natural contaminant in much coal); (4) require coal plants to meet the same emission 
standards as natural gas plants; and (5) strengthen measures against cross-state air pollution 
and regional haze.  EPA might also pursue a modified approach to regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions from these plants, such as by imposing some form of requirements for carbon capture 
and sequestration.50  Every one of these efforts would be litigated, and as shown above, today’s 
Supreme Court may not be the friendliest of venues for environmental advocates. 
 Another potential tool the Biden administration might consider using is Section 115 of 
the Clean Air Act,51 which EPA can invoke if air pollution from the U.S. is endangering public 
health or welfare in another country (which it is) and the impacted foreign country provides the 
United States with reciprocal rights.  EPA can then require the states where the pollution 
originates to control those emissions.52 The language in Section 115 is cleaner than that in 
Section 111(d) and it thus has fewer legal vulnerabilities, but the major questions doctrine and 
the nondelegation doctrine could still cause problems if EPA were to invoke it. 
C. Natural Gas 
 Carbon dioxide emissions from burning natural gas (not only in power plants but also in 
heating buildings and other energy uses) in the U.S. first exceeded those from coal plants 
 
49 Am. Lung Assn. v. EPA , No. 19-1140 (D.C. Cir. January 19, 2021). 
50 Carbon capture and sequestration is a set of technologies that can greatly reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by capturing and transporting carbon dioxide and then injecting it into depleted oil wells or 
deep underground rock formations where it can be stored. 
51 42 U.S.C. §7415. 
52 MICHAEL BURGER, ED., COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE WITH SECTION 115 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: LAW AND 
POLICY RATIONALES (2020). 
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around 2015,53 and more natural gas infrastructure is being built every year.  Natural gas was 
long regarded as a clean fuel, and its emissions of particulate matter and other conventional air 
pollutants are very low.  The chief reason U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have been gradually 
declining for several years is that many coal plants have been replaced by natural gas plants.  
But natural gas is still a fossil fuel. When it is burned it generates carbon dioxide, and its chief 
component, methane, is an even more powerful greenhouse gas if released unburned, such as 
through leaks in pipes.  It has become abundant and cheap because of hydraulic fracturing, but 
that has its own environmental problems. During his campaign, Biden repeatedly vowed not to 
ban fracking,54 but meeting his clean electricity and net zero emissions targets will mean 
phasing out most natural gas as well as coal as sources of energy.55  
 Natural gas power plants continue to be built at a steady clip.56  Most of the same Clean 
Air Act authorities that EPA could use to impede the building of new coal plants could also be 
used to control new natural gas plants.  This would entail promulgating new regulations, 
perhaps requiring the use of carbon capture and sequestration technology, or co-firing the 
natural gas with hydrogen that was produced using renewable energy. Those regulations 
would face litigation about their economic and engineering feasibility, so EPA would be 
required to produce a solid record to withstand judicial review. 
 Leakage and flaring of methane during oil and gas production, and leakage of natural 
gas during production, processing, and distribution, are now known to be even greater 
problems than was thought just a few years ago.  Nonetheless, the Trump administration 
revoked Obama-era regulations that curtailed these emissions. Those regulations need to be 
reinstated, strengthened, and expanded to cover existing as well as new facilities. 
 The Natural Gas Act gives FERC almost exclusive regulatory authority over interstate 
natural gas pipelines.  FERC has been hospitable to pipeline expansion, even before Trump.  
President Biden should be able to attain a Democratic majority on FERC in mid-2021, although 
the exact timing depends on whether there are early retirements and the pace of Senate 
confirmations. At that point, perhaps FERC will cast a newly critical eye on new pipeline 
projects, as well as on liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. 
 The continued construction of natural gas power plants, pipelines, and LNG export 
terminals creates expensive assets that will have to be stranded if we are to migrate away from 
this fossil fuel.  It also strengthens the resolve of the powerful economic interests that will 
 
53 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY-RELATED CO2 EMISSIONS FROM NATURAL GAS SURPASS COAL AS FUEL USE 
PATTERNS CHANGE (2016).  
54 An administration’s ability to ban fracking is very limited because Congress has exempted it from the 
principal statute that would otherwise regulate it, the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)(d)(1). 
55 Natural gas will continue to be needed as a feedstock for many petrochemical operations. 
56 Stephanie Tsao & Richard Martin, Overpowered: Why A US Gas-Building Spree Continues Despite 
Electricity Glut, S&P GLOBAL (Dec. 2, 2019).  
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oppose this migration.  If EPA, FERC, and the Department of Energy (which also has a role in 
approving LNG exports) were to make full use of their existing statutory authorities to restrain 
the production and use of natural gas, the success of the inevitable litigation that would follow 
might be influenced by how the Supreme Court views the Chevron deference, major questions 
and nondelegation doctrines. 
 The Biden administration will also be able to limit natural gas development on public 
lands by reducing the amount of land offered for lease, restricting the issuance of drilling 
permits, or increasing royalty rates. 
D. Energy Efficiency and Buildings 
 Improving the efficiency of energy use is one of the most important tools for tackling 
climate change.  A series of congressional actions starting with the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975 and extending through the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 
have incrementally added to (and occasionally restricted) the authority of the Department of 
Energy to impose efficiency standards on appliances and industrial equipment.  Many 
standards are now in place, but there is much more the Department could do with its existing 
statutory authority to adopt new standards and update and strengthen existing ones, and to 
improve the testing methods used to enforce compliance.  These efforts would reduce energy 
use and greenhouse gas emissions and lower consumers’ utility bills.57   
Unsurprisingly, the pace of this work slowed to a crawl during the Trump 
administration.  In October and November 2020, two lawsuits were filed – one by fourteen 
states, the other by six environmental groups – against the Department of Energy over 
violations of mandatory deadlines for energy efficiency standards for twenty-five consumer and 
commercial products.58 
 The governing statute requires the standards to “be designed to achieve the maximum 
improvement in energy efficiency … which the Secretary determines is technologically feasible 
and economically justified.”59  The courts have upheld the use of the social cost of carbon in 
making this determination.60  This is another reason why the Trump administration’s 
trivialization of the social cost of carbon needs to be undone.  Appliance standards are complex 
and typically follow extended technical negotiations with the manufacturers, but where 
 
57 JOANNA MAUER & ANDREW DELASKI, APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN 
ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., A POWERFUL PRIORITY: HOW APPLIANCE STANDARDS CAN HELP MEET U.S. 
CLIMATE GOALS AND SAVE CONSUMERS MONEY (2020); Kit Kennedy, Lighting, Appliances, and Other 
Equipment, in LEGAL PATHWAYS supra note 39 at 217-255. 
58 New York v. Brouillette, No. 20-cv-9362 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 9, 2020); Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Brouillette, No. 20-cv-9127 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 30, 2020). 
59 42 U.S.C. §6295(o)(2). 
60 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Energy, 832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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disagreement remains and litigation ensues, the government needs a solid administrative 
record to prevail. 
 Residential and commercial buildings account for 28% of the energy consumed in the 
United States61 and 27% of natural gas used.62  Thus, reducing buildings’ energy use is a key 
element in fighting climate change. The nonprofit sector has taken the lead here. The U.S. Green 
Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) voluntary 
standards have gained wide acceptance in the real estate market.  The federal government has a 
limited role in the efficiency of buildings, except for its own. The federal government is the 
largest building owner in the United States and can mandate that its buildings comply with 
LEED or similar standards.  Congress has encouraged energy conservation in federal buildings 
beginning in 1976, and continuing through the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.63 
However, President Trump revoked an executive order issued by President Obama setting 
targets for building energy intensity, water intensity, and greenhouse gas emissions, replacing it 
with something much vaguer.64  Promptly after his inauguration, President Biden revoked this 
Trump action.65  Beyond that, President Biden will have broad authority to require federal 
buildings to set a model for the nation, and also to ensure that the federal government procures 
only the cleanest vehicles and the most efficient appliances and other equipment, helping to 
boost the market for these products.  The federal government annually purchases fifty-four 
terawatt hours of electricity, but only 10% of it comes from renewable sources.66 This too is 
within the administration’s control. 
 Existing buildings not owned by the federal government are a much harder nut to crack.  
Most of the buildings that will be standing in 2050 already exist today. Achieving net zero 
emissions will require retrofitting most of them to make them more efficient, to convert oil and 
natural gas heating and gas cooking to electricity, and to put solar panels on their roofs 
wherever possible.  All of this is mostly a matter of building codes, which are set by state and 
local governments.  These codes need to be revised to move in the direction of net zero 
emissions. 
 
61 Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Energy is Consumed in U.S. Buildings?, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION (June 15, 2020). 
62 Natural Gas Explained: Use of Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 30, 2020).  
63 James Charles Smith, Existing Buildings, in LEGAL PATHWAYS supra note 39 at 277-300. 
64 Exec. Order No. 13834, 83 Fed. Reg. 23771 (May 17, 2018), replacing Exec. Order No. 13693, 80 Fed. Reg. 
15869 (Mar. 19, 2015); See also AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY A BUILDINGS 
EFFICIENCY AGENDA FOR 2021: STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL BUILDINGS (November 2020).  
65 Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 737 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
66 OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF RENEWABLE ELECTRIC 
ENERGY.  
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 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as the Waxman-
Markey bill, would have not only established a nationwide cap-and-trade program67, but also 
required a national energy efficiency code for buildings.68 That bill died in the Senate, and there 
has been little discussion of a binding national code since then.  If one were somehow enacted, 
serious legal questions would arise concerning how to enforce it.  It is hard to imagine federal 
agents going into each town hall in the country to make sure that all building permit 
applications comply with the federal code.  Moreover, even if they did, the federal government 
cannot tell local officials such as building inspectors what to do without risking a finding that 
their instructions violate the “anticommandeering” doctrine under the Tenth Amendment, 
which reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to 
the states.69 More plausible, if Congress were to appropriate the money, would be a program 
that provides states or cities that opted in with substantial financial assistance for building 
retrofits and inspections. 
E. Renewable Energy 
 Achieving President Biden’s goal of zero carbon electricity by 2035 is a formidable task.  
It will require the retirement of all coal plants and just about all natural gas plants (except 
perhaps some that are held in reserve to meet peak demand or equipped with carbon capture 
and sequestration). The nation’s fleet of nuclear plants is aging. Many will retire by 2035, and 
barring stunningly rapid development of new technologies, no new ones will be opened by then 
except for two now being built in Georgia. At the same time, the demand for electricity will 
soar, despite aggressive energy efficiency measures, due to the electrification of vehicles, 
building temperature systems, and some industrial uses.   
Current renewable generation capacity in the U.S. is 1,100 gigawatts.70  A 2020 study by 
the Zero Carbon Action Plan concluded that this will need to grow to 3,000 gigawatts by 2050.71 
That would entail adding an average of about 300 gigawatts a year, mostly from wind and solar 
– an order of magnitude greater than the current annual record.72  
 
67 Cap and trade programs are market-based approached to controlling pollution by providing economic 
incentives for reducing the emissions of pollutants. 
68 See Amit Talapatra, FED’N OF AM. SCIS., IMPLEMENTING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDING CODES BASED ON 
THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 (2009).  
69 Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
70 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, Table 6.1, Electric Generating 
Summer Capacity Changes. 
71 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK, ZERO CARBON CONSORTIUM, AMERICA’S ZERO CARBON 
ACTION PLAN 33 (2020). A good-sized nuclear power plant has a capacity of about one gigawatt. 
72 Id. 
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 Federal lands and waters have immense potential for hosting many of these facilities, 
especially in the western states and off the coasts.73  Most of the land is administered by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).  BLM can speed up the leasing of this land for renewables 
and charge lower rents, while also slowing down leasing for coal, oil, and natural gas 
extraction.  The development of renewable energy facilities on federal lands is often delayed by 
the worthwhile but often protracted environmental assessment processes under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rather than 
conducting separate reviews for each project, these processes can be sped up by undertaking 
regional environmental and species studies, which allows individual projects in the covered 
region to be approved much more quickly. The Obama administration did this successfully 
with the Western Solar Plan, an initiative that identified nineteen zones suitable for solar farms 
across 285,000 acres in six states.74  This is one area where the Supreme Court is likely to be 
receptive to the Biden administration’s probable position with respect to regulatory flexibility in 
using NEPA and the ESA.  The federal government almost never loses NEPA cases there.75 The 
Court issued some decisions in the 1970s and 1980s treating the ESA expansively,76 but the 
Court’s more recent decisions under the ESA read the statute narrowly.77 
 Offshore areas are controlled by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM).  
Under President Trump, who was hostile to wind energy,78 BOEM moved very slowly to 
approve some offshore wind projects. This can be accelerated, and BOEM should also open up 
more offshore areas for renewables leasing.  
 During the Trump administration, FERC took several actions that favored fossil fuel 
generation over renewables. Among them were orders requiring certain wholesale electricity 
market operators to, in effect, require renewable energy companies to bid at auctions at 
artificially high prices, allowing fossil fuel generators to outbid them. FERC has changed the 
rules under the Public Utility Regulatory Practices Act in a way that harms distributed 
renewable energy resources, and the Commission has approved natural gas infrastructure 
 
73 Though subject to environmental controversy, there is also considerable untapped potential for 
geothermal energy and for hydropower from existing dams in the United States, and for importing 
hydropower from Canada. 
74 Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable Generation Capacity, 47 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10591 (2017).  
75 Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek 
Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507 (2012). 
76 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. 
for a Greater Ore., 515 U.S. 687 (1985). 
77 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
555 U.S. 7 (2008); Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) 
78 Sophie Lewis, Trump Claims Wind Energy “Kills All the Birds.” Cats and Windows Are Actually Much More 
to Blame, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2020).  
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without considering its climate impacts.  FERC might start moving in the opposite direction 
once President Biden secures a Democratic majority. 
 FERC could also reiterate that it will approve carbon pricing in the wholesale electricity 
markets if proposed by regional market operators. FERC could give clearer guidance to these 
operators to encourage distributed energy resources, energy storage, and demand response, 
which, for example, allows utilities to raise the settings on air conditioners and reduce power to 
certain appliances in participating households during peak demand.  The Supreme Court’s 
most recent rulings concerning the two principal statutes that FERC administers – the Federal 
Power Act and the Natural Gas Act – have seemed to confer flexibility in their application 
rather than the traditionally rigid separation of authority between the federal and state 
governments.79 
IV. Conclusion 
  Unless Congress adopts major new climate legislation, the Biden administration will 
need to use existing statutes to carry out its climate pledges.  These statutes amount to a very 
large toolbox – even larger when the states use their own laws to pursue the same goals.  Using 
some of these tools could be made more difficult by the 6-3 conservative majority on the 
Supreme Court.  These legal risks can be reduced, but not eliminated, if federal agencies 
scrupulously follow the applicable administrative procedures, develop solid factual records, 
and clearly explain why they are revoking the damaging decisions of the Trump administration 
and moving forward to fight climate change.
 
79 FERC v. Energy Power Supply Association, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. 
Ct. 1288 (2016); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). 
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